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THE REAL RATE OF INTEREST:
A THESIS IN PSEUDOSCIENCE
Early in this century, Irving Fisher observed the tendency of interest
rates to fluctuate with commodity prices. There were many lines of inter-
action between such key variables as the volume of trade, the money stock,
its velocity, commodity prices, the demand for credit, and interest rates.
The relationship of interest rates to prices became a focal point in his
thinking, and from it he developed the concept of the real rate of interest.
At the time there were no national income statistics and no accepted body
of doctrine on the nature of income as a counterpart of real production.
Later, during the 1920s, he updated and elaborated his analysis. In
the great speculative boom, the prevailing practice in assessing an indi-
vidual's position was to include changes in his capital position as well as
income actually received. Fisher, in his concern with the purchasing povci
of money, carried this a step further to value the change in capital posi-
tion in terms of real value. He had seen that the financial markets did
not give full effect to the rise in prices and he attributed this to
institutional constraints. His book, The Theory of Interest , appeared in
1930.
With the onset of the Great Depression, prices plunged. The deflation
was so extreme that the mechanisms of price administration broke down in
even the most monopolistic industries. Obviously, there was no advantage
in claiming a deficiency of interest on the real rate basis when prices
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were declining. The adjustment for the real rate would in some years have
been negative, and nobody wanted that. The idea was dropped; it had seem-
ingly died — though, as events proved, it was merely dormant for a genera-
tion. In the meantime, market rates had been driven down to extreme depression
lows, and they were kept low through World War II and the late 1940s as a
measure of war-time and post-war government finance. The peg was maintained
until the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951.
In the mid-1950s the situation was ripe for the monetarist counter-
revolution started by Milton Friedman. He summarized his position in the
statement "money does matter," and nobody quarrels with this today. The
success of monetarism depended on the resumption of inflation, for which it
proposed to afford a solution. Friedman revived the real rate of interest
as one of the helpful tenets of his new quantity theory of money and
attempted to use the concept as a means of bridging the gap in that short-
cut theory by supplying a connection to demonstrate how income and output
2
were among its derivatives. In this, the real rate of interest served at
best lamely but it was accepted as a part of the theory and was assumed to
share whatever validity the whole might have. The popularity of this idea
was limited until the Vietnam War broke the price stability of the early
1960s. It then gained strength, and in the 1970s, support in the financial
Harry G. Johnson, "The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-
Revolution," Richard T. Ely Lecture, December 1970, American Economic Review
,
May, 1971. ^
2
"A Monetary Theory of Nominal Income," Journal of Political Economy
,
March-April, 1971.

-3-
community widened. The concept developed the promise of having an effective
payoff for lenders as the inflation persisted through two recessions.
Many among the growing numbers who came to believe in the permanence
of inflation felt that the market rate of interest should be free to match
the real rate and this resulted in various moves toward higher interest
charges. In the double-digit inflation and sharp recession in late 1974,
the institutional restraints on interest rates were mostly lifted or
inactivated; revelation of the threat of illiquidity and bad debt produced
fears of a financial crisis. One way to recover liquidity is to raise
prices for higher earnings, and this was done in many lines of business, so
that profits could be made at operating rates well below capacity.
Housing in particular suffered severely from high interest rates in
competitive investment outlets as well as from high mortgage rates and
other cost increases, and was further depressed by diversions of funds in
the drive for liquidity. The disorganization of the housing market led to
proposals for restimulation through indexing in the form of variable rates
of interest. Some declared these to be necessary for recovery. They could
point to the fact that such practices had already been put into, effect in
some developing countries, notably Brazil, where improving the take for the
mortgage lender was said to be a stimulus to building and a source of eco-
nomic progress. Under the authoritarian regimes in such countries, the
complex of measures imposed, aided by enforced political stability and a
prosperous outside world, could appear for a time to be wholly successful.
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What the real rate of interest is supposed to provide is a basic rate
of interest return to capital and in addition an increase in the amount of
that capital sufficient to maintain its real value in relation to the
prices of goods and services in general. In other words, the rate of interest
charged the borrower should be made up of two parts: a basic rate of return
plus an increment to the principal equivalent to the rate of inflation in
the economy. In the United States, the basic short-term rate of return
should probably be low, say about 3 percent, because the resources available
for expansion are large, but most advocates of indexing would propose some-
thing like twice this figure. The inflation premium would, of course, be
determined by the "inevitable" upward movement of prices, since any possi-
bility of the reverse is ignored. Some even hold that this portion of the
return to the lender should be nontaxable. There are several points of
view from which this concept may be considered.
As Response to Inflationary Conditions
First, the money and capital markets are not unresponsive to the con-
ditions that bring on inflation. During the past decade interest rates rose
much faster than prices in general. The prime rate almost doubled from
Uh percent in 1964 to 8% percent in 1969. There was a setback in the reces-
sion of 1970 and the rate was kept low through the election of 1972, but
by the summer of 1974 the rate rose to an unprecedented high of 12 percent,
or almost three times the level during the period of relative price stability
of the early 1960s. These gains of nearly 100 and 200 percent represent a
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degree of inflation for the price of money far outrunning the general price
inflation of about 20 and then «0 percent. Even so, they are often explained
away on the grounds that the "rea^ ' rate had not gone up at all.
Price and interest rate fluctuations were long regarded as cyclically
correlated, but the old pattern has been broken. Since 1969 prices have
continued to rise through two recessions. The price competition that was
supposed to develop with idle capacity and manpower did not become effective.
The dominance of business concerns with power to set prices for profit even
when volume was reduced led to an acceleration of the inflation. In the
recession of 1974-75, the most severe since the 1930s, interest rates held
high; short-term rates fell back from their peaks but were still at histor-
ically high levels, and long-term rates held near their peaks.
Like business concerns in general, the banks were seeking liquidity
by way of obtaining maximum earnings, and they were encouraged in this
venture by the three bank-regulatory agencies, the same agencies that
earlier had competed with each other in giving them opportunities to get
overextended. The recession produced a surge of conscience in the banking
system, resulting in such a concentration on quality of loans that many
business concerns, even rather large ones, could not obt-'.in finds. Recovery
was not promoted by these policies. The federal budget was forced to bear
the burden alone.
It has become common in discussions of inflation to downgrade increases
in money income as nominal or illusory. The implication is that it is
appropriate to go beyond the usual definition of income in transaction

terms to tae real values underlying them. Thus, it may be concluded that
tne real rate of interest is a true measure , and that the lender is
entitled to a higher rate of return tnan the market would set. This special
consideration for loan funds would seem to make them more sacred tiian the
aollars in wuich they are denominated. Lenders, who are often borrowers
too, generally have no desire to preserve real values on their own liabil-
ities j such as oain* deposits. In contrast, the adders of the latter might
regard their claims to nave equal justification for protection against loss
of value. However, if all holders of money claims were provided enough
more each year to restore tneir real values, there would be no end to
inflation. So nobody proposes to extend tae special status claimed for
loan funas to the working balances or other fixed dollar assets held by
business and consumers.
The main reason cited in support of the real rate is that it is sup-
posed to represent a more equitable relation between lender and borrower
in periods of rising prices. Jo doubt the averages work that way 5 especially
over long periods, but the proposicion that everybody can make money on
borrowed funds in a period of inflation is fallacious. Ask the investor
who bought stocks on margin in January 1973 and was sold out a few months
later. Or the consumer who borrowed in mid-1974 only to lose his job and
his car shortly. Tne businessman who is hard pressed by rising costs and
competition is put under even greater pressure when he must pay twice as
much on borrowed funds. The volume of distress borrowing has been heavy,
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and to uone of these borrowers is the case for favoring the lenders with
higher "real" rates valid.
It seems strange that some strong supporters of free markets are not
willing to let the money market determine the rates payable. Milton Friedman
recently stated that US savings bonds are the 'greatest rip-off in modern
history/ 1 and recommends that the government add a cost of living index
factor to the cash-in value at maturity. This recommendation to improve the
buyer's take at public expense snifts to a new and different principle.
Evidently a market is there, with new sales running about $7 billion a year
for a net increase in the total outstanding of about $4 billion. True,
patriotism supports it s but to that extent it fits the pattern of stratified
markets in tne private sector.
Any indexing scheme has some effect toward increasing the flow of funds
chasing goods, and this adds to inflationary pressures. In the special case
of indexing interest rates, it would in addition increase benefits to the
owners of wealth, the group best able to take care of itself. Since this
group is leading, not lagging, in the inflation, the degree of inequity
would widen. It is a downgrading of economics as a science to present
indexing for the real rate of interest as either a source of equity or a
satisfactory policy for living with inflation.
As Investment Goal
Another way of looking at the real rate of interest is as a statement
of an investment goal. As such, it replaces the old maxim, safety of
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principal ; with a new one., safety of purchasing power. Anybody is free to
cnoose any goal he may wish; of course, but achieving that goal in practice
is the real problem. The desire for freedom from risk — in this case a
transfer to the borrower of risk on the value of principal — can hardly be
satisfied. One investor may lose 15 percent in a year of stable prices;
another may hold even, but have the value of his capital reduced by 15 per-
cent inflation. It may be regrettable that anybody should lose on an invest-
ment, in either way, but nobody who invests should expect to be guaranteed
a specific profit either in dollars or in purchasing power.
It is sometimes «aid that if rates do not produce a real return, poten-
tial lenders will witnhold their funds. In that case, the rest of us should
say, 'Good I The help of hoarding in holding down inflation is appreciated! 1 '
'unfortunately, it is not a realistic point. The owner of liquid capital can
easily figure out that he will wind up better off by accepting the market
rate, no matter how high the rate of inflation, than by just holding cash.
Any interest received at least partly offsets the loss in real value.
In any case, there is no compulsion on anybody else to consider an
investor's goal realistic or to incur unnecessary costs in supporting his
accumulation. On tne contrary, if it is at public expense, those who are
not directly involved should resist proposals that would enact such special
advantages through official action. The whole history of subsidies, direct
or through tax loopholes, tells how they wind up as charges against tax-
payers, some special community group, or consumers in general. Frequently
3
V Lewis Bassie, "Subsidies," International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Vol. 15, p. 363.
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these measures were imposed for the benefit of influential groups who gained
command over the political powers that could enforce their claims against
the opposition of others who considered their interests unfairly affected.
If the channels of communication are restricted against the latter, as in
the less developed countries, opposition may appear to be negligible.
Where indexing of mortgages has been adopted, it is usually assumed
that inequities have occurred because of differences in indebtedness and
ownership of property. If the principal of the debt is periodically raised
with the index, the borrower constantly finds he owes more than he did at
the start, and this rising debt is presumably justified by increases in the
value of the property. On this basis, the indexing is essentially a method
of transferring the windfall gains that accumulate during inflation from the
active investor, the primary risk- taker, to the lender. Thus, it consoli-
dates the position of the financier-saver, maintaining the inequality of
wealth, and restricts the growth of the middle classes upon which future
prosperity and the development of democracy depend. It is precisely this
kind of maneuvering for advantage in which the sorry meaning of inflation
lies. There is nothing in scientific economics to explain or justify such
developments.
If the government should index its own obligations, the beneficiaries
would have more money to spend or lend. If it could also be induced to
forego taxes on the portions of interest euphemistically called maintenance
of capital, the benefits would be extended into the sphere of tax subsidies,
and again the expanded flow of funds would be feeding the fires of inflation,
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In either case, the government would have to search for other sources of
revenue. As the taxing power became strained, deficit financing would aggra-
vate the problem. Deficits and inflation would build upon and perpetuate
each other. It is a situation in which the ostensible opponents of inflation,
the recipients of the added funds, would gain additional incentives for
using inflation and "fiscal irresponsibility r ' to their own relative advan-
tage.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a downturn some time or other is not
so insignificant that no mention need be made of what would be done in future
periods of deflation. Suppose prices should decline and indexing works both
ways. Then the government would collect from the man with money in the bank,
and interest received by the bond holder would go to the government to com-
pensate for the higher "real" value of his claim. Would the banker whose
loans commanded a higher "real" value be prepared to sacrifice current earn-
ings on this account, even though deposits and assets of the bank were fall-
ing, or would he perhaps insist that there had to be some minimum below
which the rate of interest he charged could not fall? If it is not possible
to tax unrealized gains in a prosperous situation, how could anyone expect
people to pay taxes on unrealized "real" gains during hard times? Clearly,
the rules for indexing would have to be changed. The real rate of interest
describes a one-way street.
As Apologia for High Interest Rates
A third look at the real rate of interest sees it as an apologia for
high market rates of interest. In this role it is used to justify high
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interest charges by the banks and other lenders and it distorts management
of money and credit by the Federal Reserve Board. The Fed is willing to
accept high interest rates today because it fears the potential restimula-
tion of inflation, and this possibility might become even worse should it
be necessary to bail out many private banks with high powered money. So the
Fed hopes that natural sources of recovery will bring a resumption of indus-
trial investment.
The lending institutions constantly advocate a strong fight against
inflation through tight money , a condition which they identify with high
interest rates. These are the prices of their own product, so what they
want is the restriction of other prices, using their own high returns as the
main instrument of restriction. Although the talk is anti-inflation, what
the banks are actually selling is credit. The more credit they sell, the
greater the spur to inflation. So they are indirectly selling inflation
and some special effects of an inflation that is ostensibly unwanted provide
a sales pitch for putting it across. With other financial institutions they
advertise a philosophy of buy nor because it will cost more later, and bor-
row to buy now because loans can be repaid later in cheaper dollars.
At the same time the banks can deny that the inflation brings them any
"real' : profit. The failure to gain the real rate of interest is only one
part of the explanation for this. The other argument appeals to rising
costs, they have to pay interest on CDs and other time deposits, and when
these rates soar, it appears that very little is being made on the marginal
loan. In considering this argument we are perhaps supposed to forget that
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every textbook in economic principles has a chapter on monopoly in which it
is pointed out that profits are maximized at the point where marginal reve-
nue is equal to marginal cost, lioreover, the costs which set the pace, that
is, the rates paid on time deposits, are within the banking sphere of opera-
tions and can be ixifluenced as the bankers desire. If higher costs mean
higher profits, by all means put them up. On the real rate thesis, there
is no profit anyway.
The setting of interest rates, like the setting of prices in general,
has become increasingly a matter of price administration. Each industry
finds it desirable to have a rationale for price increases and banking is no
exception. A few big banks set the pattern, and most banks follow the lead
in conforming to the prime rate they agree upon. The prime rate is a stan-
dard known to all as the basis for proper charging, not unlike the rule of
Pittsburgh Plus which used to be followed in steel » so even banks outside
the centers of finance can hold to the same virtually noncompetitive rate
structure. Thus they can say to a customer, "We have to charge the prime
rate plus 3 percentage points for loans on receivables." Or something sim-
ilar. Significantly in the great upsurge of 1974, the prime rate took the
lead from the volatile rates on federal funds and commercial paper in moving
up to the extreme 12 percent peak, and on the subsequent decline it lagged
substantially.
Citicorp apparently had wanted to avoid the monopolistic implications
of all this and adopted a formula which related its prime rate with a short
lag to the rate on commercial paper. However, in the spring of 1975, during
the sharp decline from the peak, Citicorp set aside its formula in order to
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avoid breaking the prime rate below the 7.50 percent which the rest of the
banks considered appropriate. Then, in two stages, it modified its formula
to meet industry standards, first it raised the differential of the prime
rate over commercial paper to 1.25 percentage points in April, and then to
1.5 percentage points early in the new year.
In the recession, the number of banks on the 'watch lists of the
regulatory agencies rose very sharply. Bank profits plunged
,
part of the
drop being due to large set-asides for reserves against bad debt. The
REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) typically could not keep up the pay-
ments due on the funds they had borrowed; and the banks are often carrying
them today without receiving interest due because it is a way to help sal-
vage their own positions. The same holds true for some other loans which
will be bad debt if the borrowers are called for payment. For the year
1975 as a whole , the rate of inflation was about 7 percent, roughly the
same as the 6.75 percent prime rate being charged at year end. In the view
of many financial analysts, however thinly based that view may be in
scientific analysis, the prime rate was barely adequate to maintain the
real value of capital and did not produce any real net income at all.
Confusion of Income and Capital Values
here we encounter the basic technical difficulty with the real rate
of interest. The concept confuses the definition of income by introducing
an intangible change in the value of capital. In a money economy, income
typically arises from transactions in which goods or services are exchanged
for cash. The income to the seller is the difference between the price he
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receives and the outlays lie had to incur in making the sale possible. From
a welfare standpoint the income he receives may or may not be adequate to
buy the things he needs or desires 3 and it may or may not be as adequate
this year as it was last year. If he is below a poverty standards, social
justice may require that he be given assistance via government transfer
payments, ifone of that changes the basic measure of the income received.
In this hind of comparison, it is important to keep the definition of
income separate from the definition of unrealized changes in wealth. Wealth
is the value of assets owned at a given point of time 5 measured in dollars
at that time. Index numbers may be used to convert to dollar values of
another time even though such alternative values are inaccessible. From
the welfare standpoint again, the individual may consider himself better or
worse off as the real value of his holdings has changed. This depends upon
his success in making investments with a good payoff as well as upon changes
in the general economic situation. But his current consumption is not nec-
essarily affected.
Since inflation lowers the real value of the dollar and dollar-denominated
debt instruments j concern is expressed that the liquid capital available for
investment will be unduly curtailed. Actually 3 the accumulated wealth in
the economy has grown tremendously. The presumed inequity in letting infla-
tion reduce its real value per unit takes no account of this growth. In
every year of the 1970s private liquid asset holdings advanced and in every
year except 1973 they moved up faster than current dollar gross national
product. Since the volume of money and credit has far outstripped the growth
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of real product, the threat to real investment which is supposed to derive
from putting asset holdings on a constant dollar basis is purely imaginary.
It is always possible to find or create financing for anything the
economy is able to produce. The effort to convert liquid capital into real
capital would under ordinary circumstances be at the heart of the inflation
problem. The situation that developed in the recent recession brought other
considerations heavily to bear on decisions to raise prices , and it was the
scramble to regain liquidity that drove interest rates to their peaks.
A complete evaluation of the capital position of the lenders, there-
fore, should take account of the volume of credit issued as well as its
value per unit. As a group, they have suffered no real deterioration, and
to the extent that inflation has reduced the value of their holdings, it is
in accordance with public policy in the fight against inflation. The only
way to halt inflation is to keep somebody from having everything he wants.
The owners of wealth are a small proportion of the total population, though
with a lot of weight in money terms, and it is not inappropriate to let
some kind of restriction begin there.
With the real rate of interest , the question of equity moves into con-
sideration of such capital positions. Inevitably this brings into play
competing claims of one holder as against those of another and numerous
pleas for equal treatment. The details of potential claims against exist-
ing and expected capital are innumerable and the problems of valuation
insuperable. It is no more than an assumption by the real raters that the
holder of wealth is entitled to have its real value maintained. What they
are proposing is a new set of entitlements that is unrelated to the specific
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costs of doing business with any particular borrower , \j\\o may or may not be
able to profit from the loan, liaxxy loans are made to home buyers or con-
sumers engaging in some personal project that will produce no money return
at all. The proposal is not one in support of the current or traditional
market system., but is destructive of it in opening the door to intangible
attachments to ordinary business practice.
Indexing to assure the real value of capital is not the same as index-
ing to reimburse social security recipients who have been hurt by inflation,
or ever is indexing wages in general. Keeping the current income of the
latter groups in line with rising prices does not increase their command
over available goods and gives them none of the benefits of increasing pro-
ductivity. To say that indexing for one group requires indexing for all is
just another way to confuse the issue. The decision to keep the current
position of low-income groups from deteriorating in no way justifies
increases for those who have gained. Furthermore, the real rate of interest
does not index on the same basis as current income. If prices rise 10 per-
cent, the indexing of 6 percent interest income would put it up to 6.6 per-
cent, not 16 percent as the real rate would specify. The latter widens the
scope of adjustments for the owners of wealth in such a way as to aggravate
the inflation control problem.
In the national income accounts, the definition of income is attached
to current production. In tax policy, it is attached to questions of per-
sonal gain and equity between individuals. Capital gains are taxed, though
inadequately, but these also conform to the transactions basis for measuring

-17-
income. Unrealized gains are not taxed and there is no point in compensa-
ting unrealized purcnasing power losses either in higher prices or in tax
allowances.
As for the indexing proposals, the government is in no position to com-
pensate for declines in the real value of wealth. There are simply no prac-
tical means of doing so., though many methods could be dreamed up by those
hoping to pay less. The only way an income tax can be administered effec-
tively is in terms of some firm definition of income. Departing from this
would open the door to .aa. many new forms of avoidance, figure-juggling, and
lobbying that the whole structure of the tax system would be undermined.
Even on the definition of income as gains realized through actual transac-
tions, the tax system is already overburdened with loopholes.
When the government tries to sustain aggregate demand in a recession,
the progressive tax system forces it to incur deficits. To the extent that
those who are able to set prices or interest rates as they please can pro-
fit from the compensatory fiscal policy, the deficits are quickly absorbed
into their surpluses. As Treasury Secretary Simon puts it, "They national-
ize their losses." The expenditures undertaken to promote recovery are
immobilized, and the pressure of inflation on personal income restricts con-
sumption and lowers the basis for capacity expansion. The result is a
stalemate that can be relieved only by a departure into instability on one
side or the other.
The country can ill afford the growth of instability, the losses of
revenue
s and the increases in inequality that this pseudo-scientific
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concept of the real rate of interest would introduce. It has no essential
use in economic analysis, adding nothing to correlations that would not be
provided by the price measure alone. Like inflation itself, it is a means
of obtaining special advantages and is of no help in reducing frictions
among social groups. Any economist who has casually endorsed the idea should
rethink his position.
V Lewis Bassie
University of Illinois
April 3, 1376
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